Iran’s crown jewel

Iran’s problem, which preceded the fall of a major part of its “empire” as built by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei under the banner of the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force, was that it had expanded beyond its ability to consolidate and stabilise the project. The Iranians assumed they had the ability to direct loyal groups, who became known as their proxies, to achieve their goals in the region.

In other words, they had a Syrian Hezbollah, a Yemeni Hezbollah, and an Iraqi Hezbollah, in the same way there was an Hezbollah in Lebanon, which imposed its will on the Lebanese and flexed its muscle regionally, first as a fighting force in Syria, and then posturing as Lebanese experts, who in reality or by training, were Iranian experts.

The name “Syrian Hezbollah” referred to a host of militias hailing from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and other countries where there are Shia, in addition to the capabilities of the Syrian state under former President Bashar al-Assad. Yemen’s Hezbollah is also well known. It goes by the name of “Ansar Allah,” a tribal religious movement that inherited the claim of the Mutawakkilite Imamate that it had a legitimate right to rule, even if it all ultimately pointed to a tribal banner behind which hid the Houthis.

The Iraqi Hezbollah, with all its various militia denominations, is the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), which evolved into a powerful force thanks to the armament, funding and support it has received. This has reached its zenith during the fight against ISIS, when the US air force became something akin to a PMF air force. This occurred despite the fact that the primary combat missions against ISIS were assigned to the Iraqi army and the emerging Iraqi security forces at the time. The PMF took advantage of the situation to arrange for the Americans to destroy parts of the territory from the air, as happened in Mosul and elsewhere.

With this destruction, influence was reshaped on the ground, opening the way for Iran to create for the first time, a geographical extension between Tehran and the Mediterranean Sea in Syria and Lebanon by linking the Iranian border to the Syrian border.

But the Iranians eventually overreached, as Hamas came into the picture, driven by its delusional perception of its capabilities, including missiles, drones and tunnels. It set the stage for Iran’s final curtain.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” was a moment of hasty and grave strategic error which Iran will forever regret, even if it continues to claim that it was all a Palestinian decision.

Israel set in motion all the plans it had prepared for years, especially those against Hezbollah, its main nemesis and spearhead of the Iranian project in the region. The Israelis dealt their Lebanese proxy a massive blow beyond any expected proportions. The party had prepared tunnels and missiles to reenact the 2006 war, while Israel laid plans for customised attacks on each and every Hezbollah member, remotely exploding the pagers they wore and the walkie-talkies they carried. When the time came for heavy bombardment, Israel leveraged its intelligence network to target the party’s leaders. Its strikes were harsh and precise, to the point that one could presume that Israel chose not to kill the current Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, in order to keep someone who could speak for the party.

The killing and destruction in Gaza continued without the slightest humanitarian consideration. Yahya Sinwar, the “engineer” of the “Flood”, was killed after he brought death and destruction onto the Strip. The Israelis even reached Tehran to assassinate Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, as well as Beirut to assassinate Hamas Deputy Chairman Saleh al-Arouri.

The Turks understood what was happening and took action (or coordinated their moves with others, it makes no difference). The Assad regime fell faster than anyone expected.

Up until that moment, the Iranians had not realised the extent of their strategic vulnerability. They activated their Yemen proxies in a very conspicuous manner, like someone moving a chess pawn to check the opposite player’s reaction. The equation partially changed after the weak reactions of the Democratic administration of President Joe Biden. But real change came with the Republicans’ return to the White House and their control of all the levers of power in Washington.

US President Donald Trump gave a new momentum to the plan of destroying Iran’s expanding map. To be completely honest, one must say the Iranians clearly received the message this time and hastily reactivated their rescue line in Muscat. Today, the Iranians are talking about negotiations, direct or indirect, with the Americans. Talks have now reached the technical stage, opening the door to face-to-face negotiations. The Iranian tone also changed rapidly. Khamenei himself began talking about positive signals.

When the US State Department de-classifies it documents, years from now, or after Omani historians take the initiative of digging into the recordings and the minutes of direct or indirect meetings, or after history hastens the fall of the Tehran regime and all its the files are released, those interested will then know what the Iranians have offered as concessions and which proxies they were willing to sacrifice to appease Washington. But from the talk and grumblings of these proxies, one can tell that the Supreme Leader and Revolutionary Guards are now leaving no room for doubt: “You, the proxies, are among the suggested concessions, not the nuclear enrichment devices.”

It was never conceivable that Iran would be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. It used that pervasive illusion to advance its larger project of regional domination. Some might argue that it is the other way around. But no observer would expect Iran to test a nuclear bomb, and if that ever happened, the American-Israeli-Western reaction would be utterly devastating.

Tehran was bargaining over the nuclear issue to preserve its major regional assets: Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza. Now that a large part of its regional project has been lost, Iran returns to negotiating table carrying with it a map of its remaining assets.

For Iran, the Syrian project has ended irrevocably, and now Hezbollah will be lucky to survive as a political party in Lebanon. The fate of the Houthis remains in doubt. It will all depend to what degree the US will to escalate the showdown with them and to what extent it will destroy their capabilities or target their leaders for elimination, as Israel did in Lebanon.

The only significant force that has survived the onslaught so far is the PMF. Given Iraq’s importance and potential, the capabilities of this force are growing, especially when one considers the degree of Iran’s political, administrative and economic encroachment in Iraq. The Iranians are putting all other proxies on the table for negotiation, but they will hesitate a lot before including the Popular Mobilisation Forces in that list. Iraq was always the crown jewel of the Iranian “empire.” Iran wants to preserve that remaining asset after so much has been lost and what remains is on the verge of being lost.

What is required of the PMF as Iran continues its manoeuvres over the nuclear issue and attempts to convince the Americans of its sincerity while also distracting them with details of the sanctions and oil production in exchange for “sacrificing” nuclear technology? Iran has conveyed its requirements through more than one militia leader of its different proxies in Iraq, who are pretending to be willing to submit to the authority of the Iraqi state and to morph into political parties while they dissolve into the Iraqi political fabric.

What Iran wants is a four-year window of opportunity, which it must buy at any cost until Donald Trump leaves the White House.

From an Iranian perspective, the regime in Tehran has been in power for more than forty years, more than 35 of which were on Khamenei’s watch. In the interim, four years of Trump’s rule elapsed during his first term in office followed by four years of hearing about Trump’s tumultuous rhetoric, and now the Republican president is back for a second term. But ultimately, Trump will leave office. No one disputes the fact that the Trump phenomenon will never be repeated again. For now, Tehran must bow to the Trumpian storm making sure its regime survives. After Trump’s departure, all options will be on the table, whether his successor is a Republican president who benefits from Trump’s economic “miracles,” or a Democratic administration that, as Biden did turns back the clock.

In some ways, this is what is on the table in Muscat. The era of proxies is over, and the road is paved for sacrificing most of them, even if Iran suggests otherwise. But losing the PMF now would be disastrous for Iran because it would mean losing everything it has built since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and since the launch of its project to export the revolution when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Tehran.

The battle for the survival of the Hashed is crucial, especially considering the schizophrenic reality of the Iraqi state,  split between one faction seeking to restore some of Iraq’s past glory, as suggested by Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani, and another insisting on governing Iraq under the umbrella of a “Coordination Framework”, which means both the PMF and Iran, as suggested by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Any statements or talk about technical or nuclear details or proxies between Tehran and Washington are intended only to obscure Iran’s true objective: its desire to protect the crown jewel of its expansionist project; Iraq.

Haitham El Zobaidi is the Executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House