The conundrum of the day after in Gaza

Back in December, around two months after the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip, I penned an article titled “The question of the day after: What follows the Gaza war?” I highlighted Israel’s vision of maintaining a presence in Gaza for an extended period while completely excluding any role for the Palestinian Authority.

I stated then that international and regional influence on Israel’s decision regarding Gaza’s future would depend on the outcome of the ongoing military conflict between the Israeli army and the terrorist Hamas movement. Delineating the boundaries of roles was difficult, as the military realities that would shape them were still unfolding or at least not final.

I claimed no Arab country would entangle itself in Gaza’s quagmire and shoulder its burdens without specific guarantees and conditions. What’s unfolding now validates my prior assessment, but the matter has evolved from a mere question into a genuine conundrum surrounding Gaza’s post-war formula.

The post-war scenario no longer only preoccupies Israel’s Western allies, primarily the US, but also Netanyahu’s partners in responsibility, whether within the Israeli government or military.
Statements allegedly from current and former military leaders even hold Netanyahu accountable for the deterioration of the situation in Gaza due to the political leadership’s failure to capitalize on military gains.

As the war approaches its eighth month, it’s evident that Netanyahu’s government insists on dictating Gaza’s future, deciding who manages what and the nature and limits of regional or international roles.
Strikingly, the internal Israeli rift between the political and military leaderships has become apparent.
The Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, says his army bears doubled costs due to the lack of political
movement to address the post-war question. With no answer forthcoming, the Israeli army finds itself forced to bleed again in Jabaliya, after supposedly winning there, and will likely face more fighting and bloodshed in other Gaza areas indefinitely.

Halevi’s statements echo those of Israeli military, political leaders, analysts, and experts, none of whom foresee a horizon for presenting and declaring a military victory, such as dismantling Hamas and eliminating its leadership or politically leveraging such a victory.

This issue’s importance lies in the necessity to erase the impact of the October 7 bloody terrorist attack by the terrorist Hamas movement, demanding a military and political response overshadowing this memory in the collective Israeli consciousness.

Bridging the gap between Netanyahu’s position and that of the army’s leaders, the Israeli opposition, and the US administration itself has become extremely difficult due to diverging visions.
The Israeli Prime Minister outright rejected Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s statement that any Israeli military rule over Gaza would be bloody and costly, necessitating hard decisions – implying opposition to entrusting Gaza’s rule to the Israeli army and the need for an alternative to the terrorist Hamas authority.

Gallant’s assessments likely stem from fears of embroiling the Israeli army in a bloody war of
attrition, facing a rebellion akin to what US forces encountered in Iraqi cities like Fallujah – a position shared by many experts and specialists, given the repeated experiences underscoring conventional armies’ inability to quell rebellion, evidenced by the Israeli army’s recent human losses from Hamas ambushes, friendly fire, and the inability to maintain control in unexpected tense situations on the ground.

Netanyahu summarizes his vision as unwillingness to replace “Hamastan with Fatahstan.” He believes the first condition for the day after is the first condition for preparing the ground for another party is to “eliminate Hamas,” meaning the army will continue its mission until the eradication of the terror movement.

I believe this goal, which should be discussed or coordinated with military leaders to assess its
decisive and conclusive attainability, stems from Netanyahu’s insistence on achieving one of the two initial war goals: eliminating the terrorist Hamas movement and restoring deterrence.
With diminishing opportunities to reach the second goal for various reasons, his insistence on the first goal becomes more intransigent, regardless of the human and material cost, as it involves the loss of his personal political future.

Consequently, the post-Gaza war quandary has become contingent on Netanyahu’s conditions as long as he remains in power: “As long as Hamas remains intact, no other party will step in to manage civilian affairs in Gaza, certainly not the Palestinian Authority,” as it “supports terror” from his perspective. Here, he finds himself at odds with American perceptions as well.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has directly stated that the Israel’s attack on Rafah will not eliminate Hamas’s presence in the Gaza Strip, saying, “Even if it goes in and takes heavy action in Rafah, there will still be thousands of armed Hamas left.”

Blinken added, “we’ve seen, in areas that Israel has cleared in the north, even in Khan Younis, Hamas coming back.” Netanyahu remains alone in the face of moderate Arab countries’ refusal to participate in managing the Gaza Strip under his perceptions, as he seeks to achieve his personal interest without considering the positions, calculations, and sensitivities of all these parties.

The problem in all the above is that Netanyahu also ignores the psychological need of the Israeli army itself, in this extremely complex and dangerous operational environment, for a clear vision regarding the day after to boost the forces’ morale instead of being satisfied with fighting and then fighting again until further instructions are issued.

Salem AlKetbi is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate